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Abstract
A sentence pragmatically implies another sentence when information in the
first sentence leads the hearer to expect something that is neither
explicitly stated nor necessarily implied by the original sentence. Thus,
The safe-cracker put the match to the fuse pragmatically Implies The safe-
cracker lit the fuse. In a cued-recall task with sentences containing
pragmatic Implications, 19% of the responses were recalled correctly while
26% of the responses consisted of the pragmatic implications of the
original sentences. The data were Interpreted as demonstrating the strong
Interaction of the subjects' long-term knowledge with the episodic memory
for sentences task.
Pragmatic Implication
2
Memory for the Pragmatic Implications of Sentences
The purpose of the present paper is threefold: (a) to propose a
classification of the heterogeneous types of "inferences" used in recent
memory experiments, (b) to show the effects in recall of one of these classes--
the class of pragmatic implications, and (c) to discuss the theoretical
implications of the findings.
Recent experiments on inferences in the comprehension and memory of
linguistic material have used a great variety of types of inferences. Typical
examples are: There is a tree with a box beside it, and a chair is on top of
the box. The box is to the right of the tree implies The chair is to the
right of the tree (Bransford, Barclay, & Franks, 1972); The bear was smarter
than the hawk, the hawk was smarter than the wolf implies The bear was smarter
than the wolf (Potts, 1972); He was pounding the nail implies He was using the
hammer (Johnson, Bransford, & Solomon, 1973); Miss America said that she played
the tuba implies Miss America played the tuba (Harris, 1974); The fuse on the
dynamite was not long implies The fuse on the dynamite was short (Brewer &
Lichtenstein, 1975); The English professor told his students a dull story
about Jane Austin implies The English professor bored his students with a
story about Jane Austin (Schweller, Brewer, & Dahl, 1976). It is obvious that
these types of inferences differ on a wide variety of dimensions; however, one
way of organizing them is to distinguish between logical implication and prag-
matic implication.
Recent work in linguistics has uncovered a number of interesting semantic
relationships between sentences, some of which involve the implications of
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sentences. The term "logical implication" will be used to refer to those
semantic relationships where one sentence seems to be necessarily implied by
another. Thus: (a) I regret that Russell made the mistake logically im-
plies I believe that Russell made the mistake (cf. Kiparsky & Kiparsky, 1970).
(b) Burrhus is taller than Noam logically implies Noam is shorter than Burrhus
(cf. Katz, 1972). (c) The psychologist managed to teach the rat to talk
logically implies The psychologist taught the rat to talk (cf. Karttunen,
1971).
The term "pragmatic implication" will be used to refer to a different
relationship between sentences. A sentence pragmatically implies another
sentence when the information in the first sentence leads the hearer to
expect something neither explicitly stated nor necessarily implied in the
first sentence. Thus, The Karate champion hit the cinder block pragmatically
implies The Karate champion broke the cinder block. Similarly, Mr. Roberts
says it is raining outside pragmatically implies it is raining outside.
For ease of exposition the pragmatic implication will be represented by a
particular sentence, although it is assumed that the underlying implication
is nonlinguistic and could be expressed by a variety of different sentences.
While the concept of pragmatic implication has been developed here to account
for certain types of errors in sentence recall, several philosophers (Bar-
Hillel, 1946; Black, 1958) have developed a similar concept for philosophical
purposes.
It is possible to use the conjunction but to provide a very sensitive
test for pragmatic implication. Robin Lakoff (1971) has pointed out that
but is frequently used in a "denial of expectation" sense. For example,
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in the sentence A platypus is a mammal but it lays eggs, the word but is
used to indicate that the information in the second clause is contrary to
the expectations produced by the information in the first clause. Therefore,
but in the denial-of-expectation sense can be used as a test of pragmatic
implication. If one sentence (or abstract proposition) pragmatically
implies another, negating the second statement and conjoining the two
sentences with but should produce an acceptable sentence. Thus, to see if
The hungry python caught the mouse pragmatically implies The hungry python
ate the mouse, the second sentence is negated and conjoined with the first
to give The hungry python caught the mouse but did not eat it (an acceptable
sentence).
It appears that the but not test is relatively specific for the relation
of pragmatic implication. The test excludes semantically synonymous
sentences (*The hungry python caught the mouse but the mouse was not caught
by the hungry python). It also excludes logically implied sentence pairs
such as: (a) *I regretted that the python ate the mouse but the python did
not eat the mouse (factive relation). (b) *The python was longer than the
garter snake but the garter snake was not shorter than the python (entailment).
(c) *The python managed to eat the mouse but the python did not eat the
mouse (implicative relation). And finally, the but not test excludes sentence
pairs that have no apparent relation to one another (*The hungry python
caught the mouse but the specific gravity of copper is not 8.9). A more
complete and detailed discussion of pragmatic implication can be found in
Harris and Monaco (in press).
Psychologists have found the study of implications in comprehension and
memory to be important because of the constraints they place on models of
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the comprehension and memory process. Models of memory that suggest that
memory is a passive system which registers the words or literal meanings of
linguistic input have considerable difficulty in dealing with the finding
that subjects' recall of linguistic material includes inferences drawn from
the original material (cf. Bransford & McCarrell, 1974 for a discussion).
The importance of inferences for models of memory has been noted from
the very beginning of experimental studies on the topic. In 1894 Binet and
Henri made a qualitative analysis of children's recall of prose and pointed
out what they called "errors of imagination" (cf. Thieman & Brewer, in
press). Bartlett (1932) also made a qualitative examination of recall
protocols and noted that the subjects' knowledge and beliefs about the
original material were reflected in the protocols. Neither of these studies
had much impact on modern memory research, so it was the classic study of
Bransford, Barclay, and Franks (1972) that revived theoretical interest in the
issue. Using a recognition memory procedure these researchers showed that
subjects confuse sentences such as Three turtles rested on a floating log
and a fish swam beneath them with sentences such as Three turtles rested on
a floating log and a fish swam beneath it. On the basis of this data Bransford
et al. attacked linguistic theories of sentence memory and proposed that in
sentence memory tasks subjects use the linguistic information and their
previous knowledge to construct new semantic descriptions for recall.
A number of studies have followed up the findings of Bransford et al.
using a wide variety of inference types. Using the distinction between
logical and pragmatic implication presented above it is possible to
classify the studies into several broad groups. The studies by Bransford,
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Barclay and Franks (1972), Potts (1972), and Paris and Carter (1973) all
used logical implications and recognition memory procedures. They all found
that subjects made false recognition responses to the logical implications
of the original sentences. The study by Johnson, Bransford, and Solomon (1973)
and the experiment dealing with perlocutionary speech acts in Schweller,
Brewer, and Dahl (1976) used pragmatic implications and recognition memory
procedures. Both of these studies found that subjects made false recognition
responses to the pragmatic implications of the original sentences. The
studies by Brewer and Lichtenstein (1975) and Harris (1974) compared logical
and pragmatic implications. Brewer and Lichtenstein used recall procedures
and found that subjects gave both logical and pragmatic implications in recall.
The study by Harris (1974) was particularly interesting in that he compared
logical implications (John managed to finish the job implies John finished
the job) with pragmatic implications (John said he finished the job implies
John finished the job) on both a comprehension task and a memory task. On
the comprehension task the subjects showed a clear discrimination between
logical implications and pragmatic implications. For the logical implication
pairs the subjects rated the logical implication true, given the original
sentence. For the pragmatic implication pairs they rated the truth of the
pragmatic implications indeterminant, given the original sentence. Yet,
when the same materials were used in the memory task the subjects made false
recognition responses to both logical implications and pragmatic implications.
Two additional studies that have dealt with inferences in memory tasks are
Kintsch (1974) and Moeser (1976). In both of these studies it appears that
the phenomena being studied are aspects of text cohesiveness (cf. Halliday &
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Hasan, 1976) and thus the inferences would best be dealt with in the framework
of studies on the memory and comprehension of cohesion in text.
Overall, the results of studies on inferences in comprehension and
memory seem quite clear. In a recognition task subjects will make false
recognition responses to both logical implications and pragmatic implications
of the original material even though the two types of inferences can be shown
to differ in comprehension tasks (cf. Harris, 1974). The finding that
subjects make false recognition responses to pragmatic implications is
particularly surprising. The subjects are clearly showing an active pro-
cessing of the material they are exposed to, since they give false recognition
responses to sentences that are only a pragmatically possible outcome of
the events described in the original sentence.
While there is considerable agreement in these recent studies, there
are some restrictions on these findings. Most of the findings that have been
interpreted as examples of pragmatic implications were taken from studies
that were directed at slightly different issues and so used somewhat narrow
types of pragmatic implications e.g., perlocutionary speech acts (Schweller,
Brewer, & Dahl, 1976); factive and nonfactive verbs (Harris, 1974);
instruments and consequences (Johnson, Bransford, & Solomon, 1973); sentences
with continuous and dichotomous antonyms (Brewer & Lichtenstein, 1975).
In addition there has been a general reliance on recognition memory tasks.
In order to carry out a recognition memory study the experimenter has to
select the implication to be tested, yet due to the creative nature of the
comprehension process it may not make sense to pick one particular impli-
cation as the implication derivable from a given sentence. In addition, the
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experimenter has to select a particular surface form for the implication
and for the foils used in the task. Thus, the results may be distorted by
the interaction of the subjects' memory of the original surface forms and
the particular surface forms chosen by the experimenter for the recognition
task. And finally, it seems somewhat incongruous for theorists who favor
reconstructive models of memory to present subjects with sentences to be
recognized rather than to allow the subjects to reconstruct their responses.
Given these limitations of the previous studies the present experiment
was designed to: focus on the theoretically interesting class of pragmatic
implications, study these implications in a recall paradigm, and cover a
wide range of types of pragmatic implication.
Method
Subjects
The subjects were 25 undergraduate students at the University of
Illinois who participated in the experiment as part of a course requirement
in introductory psychology.
Materials
The experimental materials consisted of 46 implication sentences and
46 filler sentences. The original pool of implication sentences was
developed by attempting to write sentences that would lead the hearer to
expect something that was neither explicitly stated nor necessarily implied
by the sentence. Thus, someone hearing The safe-cracker put the match to
the fuse might expect that the fuse ignited, even though this fact is not
contained in the literal meaning of the sentence, nor logically implied by
it. In order to show the-generality of the phenomenon, an attempt was
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made to make the items as heterogeneous as possible with respect to the
knowledge that would lead the hearer to make a particular inference. For
example, to make the inference that the doorbell rang upon hearing the
sentence The narcotics officer pushed the doorbell requires that the hearer
know that doorbells typically ring when pushed, while to make the inference
that the python ate the mouse upon hearing the sentence The hungry python
caught the mouse requires that the hearer know that hungry pythons eat mice.
In order to insure that the implication sentences did give rise to the
predicted inferences, they were examined with the but not test. All implica-
tions sentences used in the present experiment met the but not test, in
that an acceptable sentence resulted from the conjunction of the original
sentence and the negation of its predicted implication. The 46 filler
sentences were sentences that did not contain obvious pragmatic implications.
The order of the 92 sentences used in the present experiment was randomized,
and the resulting master list was subdivided into four experimental lists
of 23 sentences each.
Procedure
The subjects were told that they were participating in a study of
memory for sentences. The instructions stated that written recall would be
required, but did not explicitly suggest either a rote-memory or a gist-
memory strategy. Each subject received all four 23-items lists. Subjects
were seen in small groups of four or five. The order of the experimental
lists was counterbalanced. The experimenter read each list of sentences
aloud with normal intonation, allowing 2 sec between sentences. After
the last sentence on each list the subjects were given cued-recall tests
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for three of the filler sentences from that list. The recall cues consisted
of the initial noun phrases of the sentences. The subjects were given 40
sec to write the three sentences. After they had completed the cued-
recall test for the three filler sentences on the final list, the subjects
were given a cued-recall test for the 46 implication sentences and the 34
filler sentences that had not been tested previously. The recall cues
consisted of the initial noun phrases of the sentences. The subjects were
given 16 min to write their answers.
Results
The implication sentences from the recall protocols were scored using
three different sets of criteria--strict, standard, and liberal. (a) With
the strict criteria each response was classified as Correct, Implication,
Omit, or Error. A sentence was scored as Correct if it was written exactly
as presented. An Implication was scored if the response written by the subject
met the but not test when conjoined with the original sentence and what
remained of the original sentence met the criteria for the Correct category.
An Omit was scored when nothing was written after the recall cue. All
other responses were scored as Errors. (b) With the standard criteria each
item was also scored as Correct, Implication, Omit, or Error. However, an
item was scored as Correct as long as it preserved the meaning of the original
sentence. Thus, synonym substitutions, determiner shifts, and optional
syntactic transformations were ignored. An Implication was scored if the
response written by the subject met the but not test when conjoined with the
original sentence and what remained of the original sentence met the criteria
for the Correct category. An Omit was scored when nothing was written. All
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other responses were scored as Errors. (c) For the liberal criteria the
responses were scored as they were for the standard criteria except that every
response that met the but not test was scored as an Implication even if the
sentence contained an error of some type.
Under the strict scoring criteria the results for the implication
sentences were: Correct 11.5%, Omit 34.3%, Implication 20.5%, Error 33.7%.
Under the standard scoring criteria the results were: Correct 19.1% Omit
34.3%, Implication 26.4%, Error 20.1%. Under the liberal scoring criteria the
results were: Correct 19.1%, Omit 34.3%, Implication 30.6%, Error 15.9%.
Across all 46 implication sentences, the percentage of Implications ranged
from 0 to 80% for strict scoring and from 4 to 88% for both standard and
liberal scoring. Table 1 gives the modal implication response, the number of
Correct responses, and the number of Implication responses for 10 of the
sentences. The results are clear cut--subjects do frequently recall the prag-
matic implication of a sentence instead of the sentence itself. With carefully
Insert Table 1 about here
designed materials the effect is very strong. For 26 of the 46 sentences used
in this experiment there were more Implications than Correct responses (stan-
dard scoring criteria).
Qualitative examination of the responses reveals a number of interesting
phenomena. For some of the sentences there was a single obvious surface
form that expressed the implication contained in the original sentence.
For example, all of the Implication responses produced by The narcotics
officer pushed the doorbell were in the same form, The narcotics officer
rang the doorbell. However, for other sentences there was no single
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obvious surface form that captured the inference produced by the original
sentence, and the Implication responses varied widely in surface
expression. Thus, the Implication responses for the crucial verb in The
Sherman tank hit the flimsy roadblock included plowed through, went
through, crashed through, broke through, drove through, and went right
through.
Since the number of Implication responses varied widely across
sentences, an attempt was made to examine some of the factors contributing
to this variability. In making an Implication response it would appear
that there should be a trade-off between retained surface structure and
making the inference. It should be harder to make the error of recalling
the implication when the inference requires the deletion of much surface
information than when it does not. Thus, there should be fewer Implication
responses for sentences such as The POW put his pen to the confession
(implication: The POW signed his name to the confession -- 3 words deleted)
than for sentences such as The barnacles were growing on the ship
(implication: The barnacles were growing on the side of the ship -- 0
words deleted). Also, it would seem that there might be a trade-off
between the number of new words required to express the inference and the
number of Implication responses. Thus, there should be fewer Implication
responses for sentences such as The mayor opened the new super highway with
gold scissors (implication: The mayor opened the new super highway by
cutting the ribbon with gold scissors -- 4 words added) than for sentences
such as The clumsy chemist had acid on his coat (implication: The clumsy
chemist spilled acid on his coat -- 1 word added).
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In order to test these hypotheses three scores were developed for each
of the 46 sentences: (a) Deletion score--the number of words that must be
deleted from the original sentence to produce the modal Implication
response. (b) Addition score--the number of words that must be added to the
original sentence to produce the modal Implication response. (c) Total
score--the sum of the Deletion score and the Addition score. These scores
were correlated with the number of Implication responses under the standard
scoring criteria. The correlations were: Deletion score -.05, Addition
score -.41 (p< .005), and Total score -.29 (p< .05). Thus, the amount
of surface information that must be discarded does not appear to be a factor
in the occurrence of an Implication response, while the amount of new surface
information that must be added is important in determining whether an
Implication response will occur.
Perhaps the most interesting finding revealed in the qualitative
analysis of the data is the occurrence of ambiguous implications. For
some of the sentences the exact nature of the implication contained in the
original sentence was ambiguous, and so different subjects made different
inferences. Thus the verb phrase of the sentence The absent-minded professor
didn't have his car keys was recalled as: forgot his car keys, lost his
car keys, and left his keys in the car. In a similar fashion the verb in
the sentence The flimsy shelf weakened under the weight of the books was
recalled as: bent, swayed, gave way, broke, collapsed, and fell. These
responses give a good qualitative indication of the types of inferential
processes going on and clearly show that pragmatic implications are not
fully determined by the original sentence and are thus quite different
from logical implications.
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Discussion
Perhaps the most interesting aspect of the results of this experiment
is the robust nature of the recall errors in the standard laboratory setting.
For strong sentences such as those listed in Table 1, the subject is far
more likely to write down the pragmatic implication of the original sentence
than he is to write the original sentence itself. This seems a most unlikely
finding if the experiment is examined from the subjects' point of view. The
subject has come into a room and is asked to memorize a list of unconnected
sentences. The subject hears a sentence such as The hungry python caught the
mouse. The subject knows that there is no such hungry python and that the
event never occurred. Thesubject's task in the experiment is to learn the
sentences as a useless bit of episodic information, and not to update his
or her long-term knowledge of pythons. Yet the recall protocols show that
the subjects' long-term knowledge that hungry pythons are likely to eat mice
interacts with the episodic information the subjects heard to produce the
pragmatic implication in recall that The hungry python ate the mouse.
A number of investigators have suggested that subjects receiving isolated
lists of sentences with instructions to memorize the material will not deeply
process or elaborate the material (Barclay, 1973). The results of the
present study and previous work (Schweller, Brewer, & Dahl, 1976) suggest
just the opposite. The subjects' long-term knowledge of the world is so
intimately related to the language comprehension and memory systems that it
is brought to bear even in a situation as 'unreal' as the laboratory list-
learning setting. This view is also supported by the resistence of the effect
to modification by instructions. Informal studies have shown that even severe
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rote memory instructions ("try to be a tape recorder") have little effect in
reducing the number of pragmatic inferences in recall.
Due to the strength of the effect and its intuitive appeal as an
example of reconstructive memory, the recall of items such as those in
Table I makes a good laboratory demonstration. The inferences appear to
be quite automatic and nondeliberate on the part of the subjects. In fact,
after carrying out the experiment as a demonstration and finding that 90%
of the class have written the same 'wrong' sentence the class may refuse to
believe that the experimenter really read the original sentence!
While the present experiment is a good demonstration of the
reconstruction of pragmatic implications in recall, it is clear that much
more work is needed to account for the details of the recall process. In
particular the extreme differences in the strength of the effect across
items needs to be accounted for. It would seem that the particular findings
for a given item are the result of a combination of the original surface
information retained, the interaction of the episodic information provided
by the sentence with the relevant knowledge in long-term memory, and the
possible surface forms available to the subject to express the resulting
information.
Pragmatic Implication
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Table 1
Modal Implication Responses, Number of Correct Responses, and
Number of Implication Responses for 10 Sentences
Sentence: The paratrooper leaped out the door. (5)
Implication: The paratrooper jumped out of the plane. (7)
Sentence: The safe-cracker put the match to the fuse. (0)
Implication: The safe-cracker lit the fuse. (8)
Sentence: The clumsy chemist had acid on his coat. (11)
Implication: The clumsy chemist spilled acid on his coat. (6)
Sentence: The narcotics officer pushed the doorbell. (4)
Implication: The narcotics officer rang the doorbell. (7)
Sentence: The hungry python caught the mouse. (2)
Implication: The hungry python ate the mouse. (11)
Sentence: The angry rioter threw the rock at the window. (2)
Implication: The angry rioter threw a rock through the window. (12)
Sentence: The absent-minded professor didn't have his car keys. (4)
Implication: The absent-minded professor forgot his car keys. (16)
Sentence: Dennis the Menace sat in Santa's chair and asked for
an elephant. (0)
Implication: Dennis the Menace sat in Santa's lap and asked for
an elephant. (14)
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Table 1 (Continued)
Sentence: The flimsy shelf weakened under the weight of the books. (3)
Implication: The flimsy shelf collapsed under the weight of the
books. (18)
Sentence: The firmen sprayed water on the fire. (4)
Implication: The firmen put out the fire. (4)
Note -- The figure following the original sentence is the number of
Correct responses for that item, and the figure following the modal
implication is the number of Implication responses for the same item
(standard scoring criteria).
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